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ABSTRACT
Recent efforts to expand unemployment insurance (UI) eligibility are expected to increase lowearning workers’ access to UI. Although the expansion’s aim is to smooth the income and consumption
of previously ineligible workers, it is possible that UI benefits simply displace other sources of income.
Standard economic models predict that UI delays reemployment, thereby reducing wage income.
Additionally, low-earning workers are often eligible for benefits from means-tested programs, which may
decrease with UI benefits. In this paper, we estimate the impact of UI eligibility on employment, meanstested program participation, and income after job loss using a unique individual-level administrative data
set from the state of Michigan. To identify a causal effect, we implement a fuzzy regression discontinuity
design around the minimum earnings threshold for UI eligibility. Our main finding is that while UI
eligibility increases jobless durations by up to 25 percent and temporarily lowers receipt of cash
assistance (TANF) by 63 percent, the net impact on total income is still positive and large. In the quarter
immediately following job loss, UI-eligible workers have 46-61 percent higher incomes than ineligibles.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the past several years, there has been increasing recognition among policymakers
that the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program does not serve as an adequate safety net
for many vulnerable workers. In particular, all state UI programs require that workers
have sufficient labor force attachment in order to receive benefits. This requirement,
which typically takes the form of a minimum earnings level prior to job loss, excludes
low-earning workers. The Government Accountability Office estimates that low-wage
workers are more than twice as likely to be out of work relative to high-wage workers
but only half as likely to receive benefits, attributing a part of this disparity to the minimum earnings criteria for UI (GAO 2000, 2007). Furthermore, due to the growth of
the low-skilled service sector (e.g. Autor and Dorn, 2013) and the entry of former welfare recipients into low-wage jobs (e.g., Bernstein, 2004), UI eligibility requirements
are likely to have affected an increasingly large proportion of workers in recent decades.
In this paper, we examine the effect of UI eligibility on various economic outcomes
among low-earning workers. These estimates are crucial for evaluating the welfare impacts of a policy such as the UI modernization provision of the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, which allotted $7 billion to incentivize states to adopt
more liberal UI eligibility rules.1 Despite its policy importance, the consequences of
UI eligibility have long been neglected in the literature, which has overwhelmingly focused on the effects of increasing UI replacement rates or extending benefit durations
for UI-eligible workers. As we discuss below, however, these existing estimates are uninformative for understanding the impacts of expanding UI eligibility, as workers at the
1 Specific

policies included accounting for more recent earnings in eligibility determinations and allowing workers who seek part-time jobs or who quit their jobs for good cause to be eligible for benefits.
Lindner and Nichols (2012) and O’Leary (2011) have shown that these policies will indeed expand UI
access, particularly among low earners.
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eligibility margin differ in several key dimensions from the typical UI recipient.
Since the primary purpose of UI is to maintain consumption following job loss (see
Gruber, 1997 for a discussion), a first order question is whether UI eligibility has a meaningful impact on workers’ incomes. While it may seem tautological that UI eligibility
raises the disposable incomes of eligible workers, the overall impact may be dampened
(or even reversed) if ineligible workers are more likely to receive other sources of income that trade off with UI. The first source of income that we consider is earnings.
It is well documented, both theoretically and empirically (e.g., Mortensen, 1977 and
Krueger and Meyer, 2002), that increased UI generosity reduces reemployment, and
hence earnings, though existing estimates cannot easily be extrapolated to examine the
effects of expanding UI eligibility. In particular, low-earning workers are likely liquidity constrained and may therefore be more sensitive to UI (e.g., Chetty, 2008 and
Centeno and Novo, 2014). In the extreme case, ineligible workers may have no choice
but to become immediately reemployed while eligible workers hold off reemployment
until after UI benefits are exhausted. It is thus possible that, among this low-earning
group, UI-eligible workers could even have lower incomes than ineligibles, since UI
benefits replace only half of previous earnings.2 On the other hand, if UI eligibility has
a negligible effect on reemployment, expanding eligibility may have significant income
smoothing effects.
Because our focus is on low-earning workers, it is also important to consider the
effect of UI eligibility on benefits from means-tested social programs in addition to wage
income. These programs provide a consumption floor, and may simply be displaced by
UI benefits when eligibility is expanded. Mechanically, this occurs because UI benefits
are counted as income in these programs’ eligibility and benefit level determinations.
2 Of

course, eligible workers are not necessarily worse off, since they enjoy more leisure.
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On top of the potential mechanical effects, if there are significant costs to participating
in means-tested programs, as summarized in Currie (2006), workers may also choose
not to take up welfare benefits when they receive UI. If UI eligibility reduces benefits
from other programs, expanding eligibility may not only have a smaller than expected
net impact on consumption, it will also have budgetary spillover effects on other areas
of public spending.
The first major obstacle to uncovering the effects of UI eligibility on various sources
of income is the lack of high-quality data. As noted in a recent study by Meyer et al.
(2015), household survey data sets are increasingly plagued by nonresponse bias and
measurement error. They find, for example, that about half of transfer dollars from two
of the three outcome programs that we consider (cash and food assistance) are missing in several major survey data sets when compared with administrative counterparts.
Since our focus is on low-earning workers, for whom transfers are likely to comprise
a significant portion of total income, the use of survey data is particularly problematic.
On the other hand, using survey data is often a researcher’s only choice when studying
program interactions, as they are the only source of information on multiple program
use. In this paper, we utilize a unique data set from the state of Michigan, which has
the advantage of being both an administrative data set and one that spans multiple programs. Specifically, the data cover the universe of UI claimants from 2005 to 2010, and
contain information on earnings and transfers from three major means-tested programs:
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp Program), and Medicaid.
A second challenge in isolating the effects of UI eligibility lies in the fact that previous work history is used to determine eligibility. Eligible workers, who have higher
prior year earnings and possibly higher unobserved future earnings potential, are there-

3

fore systematically different from ineligible workers.3 To identify a causal effect of UI
eligibility, we use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design that exploits a minimum earnings rule for UI eligibility. We show that being above the minimum earnings threshold is
a strong predictor of ultimately being eligible for UI among claimants whose prior year
earnings are near this cutoff. We then compare the future employment, means-tested
program usage, and incomes of unemployed workers who fall just above and below the
threshold, and attribute the differences to the availability of UI.
Our analysis yields three main findings. First, UI eligibility increases jobless durations by 4.1 (13 percent) to 8.9 (25 percent) weeks, which roughly translates to a 5-14
percent drop in earnings over the next two and a half years. The larger estimates correspond to the Great Recession period, when the potential duration of UI was increased
dramatically. Second, we find that eligibility for UI also lowers TANF participation by
42-63 percent immediately after job loss, but has no effect on usage of either SNAP or
Medicaid programs. Furthermore, the reduction in TANF participation is only temporary, which suggests that some UI recipients sequentially participate in TANF after UI
exhaustion. Finally, and most importantly, we find that despite statistically significant
reductions in both wage and means-tested transfer income, the net impact of UI eligibility on total income is positive and large: In the quarter following job loss, UI eligibility
increases income by 46 and 61 percent, during the prerecession and Great Recession periods, respectively. To the extent that the observed income differences translate to consumption differences, these results indicate that there are large consumption smoothing
benefits in expanding UI access to low-earning workers.4
3 In

nonadministrative data, eligibility is often not observed. Comparing recipients and nonrecipients
is problematic for the same reasons as above, and in addition, nonrecipients could also differ if only those
who anticipate being unemployed longer apply for UI benefits.
4 One of the main arguments against using income to measure consumption for the low income population is that government transfers are widely underreported (Meyer and Sullivan, 2008). However, since
we use administrative data that cover a number of transfer programs, this is much less of a concern here.
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Finally, we use our empirical findings to assess the social welfare implications of UI
eligibility expansions. As highlighted by Baily (1978), the decreased rate of reemployment associated with UI reflects a moral hazard risk of social insurance: UI recipients
do not take into account the social costs of prolonged unemployment, in terms of lost
tax contributions. Expanding UI eligibility could therefore be socially costly, even if it
improves individual workers’ welfare through increased income and consumption. In
the final part of the paper, we examine the social welfare impact of a policy that lowers
the UI eligibility threshold using a simple model in the spirit of Baily (1978) and Chetty
(2008). Calibrating the model using observed empirical quantities and realistic values
of relative risk aversion suggests that recent efforts to increase UI access by reducing
eligibility requirements for low-earning workers may be socially beneficial.
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss our
study’s contribution to the previous literature. Section 3 contains relevant institutional
details about Michigan’s UI and means-tested programs. We then describe our empirical
strategy and data in Section 4. Section 5 contains our empirical results as well as an analysis of the social welfare impact associated with changing the UI eligibility threshold.
Finally, Section 6 concludes with a summary of our findings and policy implications.
2

PREVIOUS LITERATURE

Our study connects to three major strands of literature. First, it is related to several
studies that quantify the benefits of UI by measuring its impact on consumption and income. Gruber (1997) and Browning and Crossley (2001) directly estimate the effect of
UI benefits on measures of household consumption. Gruber (1997) finds that workers
experience a drop in food consumption during unemployment of 6.8 percent, but that the
drop would be three times larger in the absence of UI benefits, at 22.2 percent. While
Browning and Crossley (2001) finds smaller effects, they note that the effects are hetero5

geneous and largest for those with fewest assets. A more recent literature seeks to break
down the consumption impact by looking at which components of income, including
income from social programs, respond to unemployment and UI benefits. Most related
to our study is one by Rothstein and Valletta (2014), who use data from the Survey of
Income and Program Participation and find that when workers lose UI at benefit exhaustion, wage and social assistance income increase significantly, but only offsets the loss
of UI by approximately 31 percent. Kawano and LaLumia (2015) also study the effects of UI on wage and various types of nonwage income, and do so using high quality
tax return data.5 They find that more generous UI benefits (as measured by state-level
maximum benefit levels) are associated with less wage income and retirement savings
withdrawals. In contrast to these two studies, our focus is on the causal impact of being
eligible to receive UI benefits on various income sources.
Second, this study contributes to a large literature that examines the employment
effects of UI. Prior studies focus on the effects of increasing the UI wage replacement
rate or benefit duration for workers who already receive UI, and generally find that
increasing benefit generosity lengthens durations of unemployment, though estimates
of the magnitude cover a broad range (see surveys by Krueger and Meyer, 2002 and
Tatsiramos and Van Ours, 2014). In contrast, we estimate the effect of UI eligibility
rather than marginal increases in benefits, which may differ if UI-ineligible workers are
more likely to find alternative sources of income.
Finally, our study adds to a developing literature on the interaction between UI and
other social safety net programs. Most of the recent work in this area has concentrated
on whether more generous UI benefits affect disability insurance caseloads, which has so
5 Although

they are able to analyze the effect of UI on many sources of nonwage income, like retirement, disability insurance, and self-employment, they are unable to observe other social assistance
income that are not taxable.
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far yielded mixed evidence (Lindner, forthcoming; Rutledge, 2012; Mueller et al., 2013;
and Inderbitzin et al., 2013). In terms of the interaction between unemployment benefits
and means-tested programs, the study that is most closely related to ours is Browning
et al. (1995), who use the 1997 Canadian Out of Employment Panel data set and find
that when a Canadian reform disqualified a group of unemployed workers (voluntary
quitters) from UI, take-up of welfare increased by an offsetting amount. Whelan (2010)
uses the same data as Browning et al. (1995) to further examine this interaction among
all job separators, and finds more generally that lowering the potential duration of UI
increases usage of means-tested social assistance. Within the U.S. context, the effect of
UI on means-tested program participation remains largely unexplored.
3

6

INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

Unemployment Insurance
The unemployment insurance system in the United States provides temporary partial
wage replacement to workers who involuntarily lose their jobs. Because UI is administered jointly by federal and state governments, the general program features are similar
across states but differ in terms of specific eligibility requirements, benefit levels, and
the potential duration of benefits. Since we use only data from the state of Michigan, we
describe in detail the specific eligibility rules and benefit entitlements for this particular
state. These eligibility rules are central to our identification strategy.
To be eligible for UI benefits, an unemployed UI applicant must satisfy both “monetary” and “nonmonetary” eligibility criteria. Monetary eligibility requires that a claimant
demonstrate labor force attachment by having sufficient recent earnings. The specific
6 Exceptions include O’Leary and Kline (2008), who look at how UI impacts return to welfare among
former TANF participants, and O’Leary and Kline (2014), who document higher SNAP receipt among
ineligible UI claimants.
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requirement in Michigan is that during the first four of the previous five completed
calendar quarters (“standard base period”) or the most recent four completed quarters
(“alternative base period”), a worker must have earned at least $2,871 in the highest
earning quarter.7 A second criteria for monetary eligibility is that earnings in the entire
base period must be greater than 1.5 times the high quarter earnings.8 Finally, UI applicants must have had an involuntary job separation, meaning that they may not have quit
or been fired for cause (“nonmonetary eligibility”).
In normal economic times, a UI-eligible claimant near the monetary eligibility threshold is entitled to a weekly benefit amount equal to 4.1 percent of the highest quarterly
earnings in her base period, a wage replacement rate of 53 percent, for no more than 26
weeks.9 During periods of high unemployment, the potential duration of benefits may
be extended beyond 26 weeks by either the permanent federal-state Extended Benefits
(EB) program, or through a discretionary federal extension program. During our sample period, which covers the Great Recession, extensions under the EB and Emergency
Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) programs were in place at various points (see
Farber and Valletta, 2013 and Rothstein, 2011 for a history of the haphazard roll-out of
the program). Michigan UI recipients who exhausted their regular UI benefits between
June 2008 and early 2012 received between 13 and 73 additional weeks of benefits.
Furthermore, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 increased benefit
levels by a flat $25 for all recipients from March 2009 through May 2010, increasing the
7 The

high quarter earnings requirement was (nominally) $1,998 from 2005 through mid 2007, $2,697
through the end of 2007, $2,774 in 2008, and $2,871 after 2008.
8 It is also possible to be monetarily eligible for UI if a worker earns more than 20 times the state
average weekly wage (SAWW) and have earnings in two quarters of the base period. In 2010, the SAWW
in MI was $828.73, which meant that workers must have had base period earnings of $16,575. No
claimants in our sample who did not meet the usual criteria qualified using this criteria.
9 The exact duration entitlement is 0.43× Base Period Earnings , with a minimum of 14 weeks, and a maxWeekly Benefit Amount
imum of 26 weeks. Since the weekly benefit is a piecewise linear function of the high quarter earnings,
the duration entitlement is a function of how spread out earnings are over the base period. That is, the
more concentrated earnings are in one quarter of the base period, the shorter the duration entitlement.
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replacement rate to approximately 64 percent for workers at the eligibility threshold.
Means-Tested Programs
We focus on participation in three means-tested programs as our outcomes of interest:
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP), and Medicaid. To receive TANF, SNAP, or Medicaid benefits, participants must have income below certain thresholds. Importantly, since UI is counted in
the means test of all three programs, eligibility for UI may lower the amount of meanstested benefits (or disqualify the worker altogether).
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
TANF is a program that provides cash assistance to needy families. In Michigan, the
maximum benefit is approximately equal to 35 percent of the federal poverty level, and
is subject to a benefit reduction rate of 80 percent for earned income over $200 and 100
percent for unearned income (e.g., UI). To understand how UI eligibility may mechanically affect TANF benefits, consider a TANF-eligible family of three. Without any other
sources of income, the family has a standard monthly TANF payment of $492. If the
family receives UI payments of $472 a month (i.e., the minimum benefit in Michigan)
but no other income, the TANF benefit for the month would equal to $20 because UI is
taxed away 100 percent.
In addition to the income test, TANF participants are also subject to other requirements, including an asset test, work requirements, and time limits. Specifically, adult
enrollees in Michigan must have less than $3,000 in assets, work or participate in training, and are limited to a lifetime total of 48 months of aid.10 Perhaps because of the
10 Asset limits, work requirements, and time limits are common features in all state TANF programs, but

the specific requirements differ. For example, the lifetime limit in MI (48 months) is lower than required
by federal law.
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latter two requirements, which increase costs and diminish the value of being on the
program, the take-up rate of TANF is low, estimated to be around 36 percent of eligibles
nationally in 2007 (Loprest, 2012).
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp Program, provides individuals and families with a dollar amount on an electronic benefit transfer (EBT) card that can be spent on food items.
The income limit for SNAP in Michigan is 200 percent of the federal poverty line. Benefit levels are approximately 30 percent of the federal poverty line and are subject to a
30 percent benefit reduction rate (after deductions). As in TANF, benefits may therefore
be mechanically lowered by UI eligibility. For example, a family of three who has no
net income receives $497 of food stamp benefits per month.11 UI eligibility would raise
the family’s net income by up to $472, which would lower the SNAP benefit to $355
per month.
Apart from income requirements, SNAP recipients are also required to work or engage in job search-related activities, though certain groups (e.g., the elderly or disabled)
are exempt.12 Take-up of SNAP benefits is much higher than for TANF: Nationally, the
take-up rate is estimated to be at approximately 65 percent in 2005, and up to 80 percent
in 2010 (Ganong and Liebman, 2013).
Medicaid
Medicaid is a federal-state program that provides health insurance to certain groups, including low-income families, children, pregnant women, the elderly, and the disabled.
During the period studied in Michigan, there were 40 ways individuals could have poten11 Net

income is total income less deductions for earned income and some living expenses.
was no asset test during the study period in Michigan.

12 There
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tially qualified for some type of Medicaid coverage, and each sub-program had different
eligibility requirements (Center for Healthcare Research and Transformation 2012). We
focus here on programs available to healthy adults, since we are interested in program
participation among UI claimants. Generally, adults only qualify for Medicaid coverage
if they have incomes under approximately 35 percent of the federal poverty line.13 Several categories of adults have higher income limits: Pregnant women under 185 percent
of the poverty line are covered during and a few months after pregnancy, and those under
age 19 at less than 150 percent of poverty are also eligible. Finally, parents and those
under age 21 could potentially also qualify for Medicaid even if they exceed income
limits but have high medical expenses (“medically needy”).
The value of Medicaid can be approximated by per-enrollee spending, which was
$3,073 for adults in Michigan during 2011 (Kaiser Family Foundation 2015). Unlike
TANF or SNAP, eligibility for UI does not diminish the size of the benefit, unless income
exceeds the eligibility limit. Sommers and Epstein (2010) estimates the take-up rate of
adult Medicaid to be about 76 percent in Michigan, compared to a national average of
62 percent.14
4

EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA

Empirical Strategy: Regression Discontinuity Design
The goal of this study is to understand how eligibility for UI affects workers’ incomes
from various sources, including employment and other social assistance. In most nonadministrative data sets, the researcher typically observes only whether a worker receives
13 The Medicaid program is called “Low Income Families” (LIF) in MI and comes automatically with
TANF enrollment, though TANF enrollment is not necessary. If the family is no longer eligible for LIF
due to income changes, a program called “Transitional Medical Assistance” grants continuing coverage
for 12 months. Adults without children receive less comprehensive benefits.
14 This take-up rate includes adults with disabilities.
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UI benefits rather than eligibility. If we simply regress outcomes on whether or not
a worker receives UI, we would be concerned that observed receipt is correlated with
earnings ability or other unobserved characteristics that have independent effects on
worker decisions to work or participate in other programs. We overcome this potential
bias by using a regression discontinuity (RD) design and exploiting the rule that monetary eligibility for UI requires a claimant’s past earnings exceed a specific threshold.
As is well-established in the RD literature (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; DiNardo and
Lee, 2011), under certain continuity assumptions, the design allows us to identify the
causal effect of UI eligibility for the subpopulation of claimants with earnings near the
earnings cutoff.
In practice, we follow the literature and estimate local linear regressions with a uniform kernel:
Yi = β0 + τy Ti + β1 (Xi − c) + β2 Ti · (Xi − c) + εi

(1)

Di = α0 + τd Ti + α1 (Xi − c) + α2 Ti · (Xi − c) + ui

(2)

and

for c − h ≤ Xi ≤ c + h, where Yi is an outcome measure (e.g., jobless duration), Di is
an indicator for being UI-eligible, Xi is the claimant’s high quarter earnings, c is the
monetary eligibility threshold, and Ti = 1[Xi ≥c] . The fuzzy RD estimator is the ratio
of the reduced form and first stage coefficients on Ti , τ̂ =

τ̂y
τ̂d .

As noted by Hahn et

al. (2001), this is numerically equivalent to an estimate of τ in the following TSLS
regression
Yi = δ0 + τDi + δ1 (Xi − c) + δ2 Ti · (Xi − c) + νi

(3)

for c − h ≤ Xi ≤ c + h, where Ti is used as an instrument for Di .
Our main outcomes of interest are measures of employment, participation in each
12

of the three means-tested programs, and income from each source. As is noted in the
RD literature, estimates tend to be sensitive to the choice of bandwidth h. Intuitively,
a bandwidth that is too large may yield biased estimates, while a bandwidth that is too
small excludes too many observations and yields imprecise estimates. Therefore, we
estimate Equation (1), (2), and (3) using a variety of bandwidths h. In our main tables,
we report the estimates corresponding to a bandwidth of $700, which appears reasonable
for most outcomes by visual inspection.
In the Appendix tables, we also report two additional estimates and confidence intervals. We report the estimates using a bandwidth proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) and bias-corrected confidence intervals as suggested by Calonico et al. (2014).
The Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and Calonico et al. (2014) bandwidths and confidence intervals are implemented following the algorithm in Appendix B.2 of Card et
al. (2015b).15
Data
The data used in this paper are administrative records from the state of Michigan. From
the state’s Unemployment Insurance Agency, we have the universe of all UI claims made
from 2005 to 2010, which we can match to quarterly earnings from 1997 Q2 - 2012
Q2. The claims data contain detailed information on when a claim for UI benefits was
made, whether it was deemed ineligible for various reasons, the weekly benefit amount,
“regular” potential duration (i.e., before extensions), total “regular” benefits received,
and some basic demographic information. The quarterly earnings data contain earnings
in each calendar quarter reported by all private UI-covered employers, as well as each
employer’s NAICS industry code. From the state’s Department of Human Services,
we have data on whether each UI claimant received benefits from TANF, SNAP, or
15 We

thank Zhuan Pei for sharing programs that implement the fuzzy analogue of both estimators.
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Medicaid, and the amounts received (for TANF and SNAP) each month.
In this paper, we are interested in comparing the outcomes of claimants who were
deemed eligible or ineligible for UI based on their earnings at claim filing. The data
includes two types of claims that we wish to exclude from the analysis. The first type of
claim is those that are filed on the one-year anniversary of a previous claim. Since claims
are only valid for 52 weeks after the filing date, workers who were still unemployed or
on a subsequent spell of unemployment at the end of the benefit year filed new claims to
continue benefits. During the Great Recession, claimants must file again after 52 weeks
to continue EB or EUC benefits from the previous benefit year. For these reasons, we
observe in the data a mass of claims filed on or shortly after the one-year anniversary of
a previous claim. Because these new claims are unlikely to correspond to the beginning
of a new layoff spell, we exclude them from the analysis.
Second, in mid 2010, the Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2010 allowed a newly eligible claimant who had a previous higher, unexhausted EUC claim to
receive the same weekly benefit as the unexhausted claim.16 Therefore, after this law
was in place, it is possible that eligible claimants received a much higher benefit relative to eligible claimants from before the law change. Since we cannot observe which
claimants have unexhausted benefits, we make the admittedly arbitrary restriction to exclude all claims that occur within two years after another claim, under the assumption
that after two years, claimants are unlikely have previously unexhausted benefits. This
restriction also eliminates the problematic “anniversary” claims described above.
From this group of “new” claims, we select our analysis sample of claimants with
earnings near the UI monetary eligibility threshold. Specifically, we calculate each
16 The

exact rule is that if the new weekly benefit is at least either $100 or 25 percent less than the
benefit from the old claim, states may continue payment of the old EUC benefits and defer the new claim,
or supplement the regular benefit with the difference.
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claimant’s earnings in the highest earning quarter of the previous five quarters (to account for eligibility via standard or alternative base periods) and keep only claims that
are within $1,500 of the cutoff. We also exclude claimants with wage outliers – that is,
those who earn more than half million dollars in any single quarter. Our final sample
consists of 286,113 claims, of which 276,165 are unique individuals.
By definition, our analysis sample contains only low-earning UI claimants. The
earnings at the UI eligibility cutoff is approximately that of workers employed at the
minimum wage and working for about 30 hours per week during their highest earning
quarter. Relative to all other new UI claimants, workers at the eligibility cutoff are
at about the tenth percentile of the earnings distribution. Table 1 presents summary
statistics for all new claims (column 1) and our analysis sample (column 2). Compared
to the full sample of claimants, the workers in our analysis sample are younger, less
educated, more likely to be nonwhite, and have shorter job tenures.17 In our sample,
workers earned on average $7,696 in the previous year. Many claimants have had a
history of receiving welfare benefits: 15.2 percent are observed to have received TANF
benefits before the claim, 45.6 percent received SNAP benefits, and 41.6 percent were
enrolled in Medicaid.
Since our analysis sample covers periods both before and during the Great Recession, when UI was much more generous, the “treatment” of UI eligibility differed significantly depending on the timing of the claim. We explore these differences by estimating
the effects separately for two subsamples. The first subsample consists of claims made
before any extensions were in effect (i.e., before January 1, 2008), and therefore had a
maximum potential duration of 26 weeks (two quarters). The second subsample consists
of claims that potentially qualified for 92-99 weeks (at least seven quarters) of UI bene17 The

dependents measure in the UI data correspond to the number of dependents claimed for tax
withholding purposes.
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fits.18 We say “potentially qualified” because only claimants whose earnings are spread
out enough in the base period to qualify full 26 weeks of regular benefits were eligible
for the full 99 weeks. Because only 57 percent of eligible claims in the sample had a
potential duration of 26 weeks, we are likely to underestimate the effect for those who
qualified for the full 26 or 99 weeks. The short duration subsample consists of 118,523
claims, while the long duration subsample consists of 101,958 claims.
Validity of Identifying Assumptions
A primary concern with any RD design is the ability of agents to manipulate the running
variable (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). In this specific case, we
worry that claimants (or employers) are aware that they must reach the requisite amount
of earnings in the base period to qualify for UI, resulting in sorting above (or below) the
threshold. We attempt to dispel this concern by examining the density of claims, as well
as the distribution of predetermined observable characteristics, around the threshold.
We follow the standard practice of first graphically examining the density of claims and
the distribution of observable characteristics around the relevant threshold, followed by
formal regression analyses and tests for smoothness.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of claims around the high quarter earnings threshold
by plotting the number of claims in $15 intervals around the minimum earnings amount,
which is normalized to zero. Visually, there does not appear to be a jump in the number
of claims around the earnings threshold, suggesting that selection into UI eligibility is
unlikely. McCrary (2008) proposes a formal test of the smoothness assumption, which
we implement. Using his automatic bin size and bandwidth selector, undersmoothing as
18 Specifically,

the sample contains claims made between September 19, 2008 and May 15, 2009. The
potential durations are calculated assuming workers were eligible for 26 weeks of regular benefits plus
extended benefits that were in effect at the exhaustion of each benefit tier (e.g, regular, EUC, or EB). We
cannot stratify claims using actual potential duration because we do not know which base period (standard
or alternative) would have been used to calculate durations for those who were ineligible.
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suggested, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no discontinuity in the density at the
5 percent level. The lack of sorting around the threshold suggests that either claimants
and employers do not have precise knowledge of the location of the eligibility threshold,
or that it is difficult for them to exactly control the amount of high quarter earnings.
Another method that is commonly used for assessing the validity of an RD is to examine the pattern of predetermined covariates around the eligibility threshold. We create
two summary measures of covariates by linearly predicting outcomes (the probability of
being employed and the probability of receiving any means-tested benefits in the quarter
after the claim) using the following baseline covariates: gender, industry (19 dummies),
number of dependents (5 dummies), education level (4 dummies), race (4 dummies),
age deciles (9 dummies), tenure deciles (9 dummies), county (82 dummies), deciles
for earnings in the previous 10 quarters (9 dummies), and year (5 dummies). Since
each predicted outcome is simply a linear combination of predetermined covariates, we
would expect them to evolve smoothly across the threshold if the RD were valid. Figure
2 plots the binned averages of these predicted outcomes, and shows no perceptible discontinuities in either covariate index. The first two rows of Table 2 quantify the size of
these discontinuities by estimating Equation (1), with each outcome Yi being a different
covariate index, for a variety of bandwidths. The estimates roughly confirm the visual
evidence that there are no discontinuities in the predetermined covariates, especially at
smaller bandwidths. The next few rows of Table 2 break down the covariate index into
some of its main components, which tell a similar story.
One predetermined covariate that we did not include in the covariate index is the
probability that a claimant has received welfare benefits (from any of the three programs)
in the observable past. As one might expect, whether a claimant has ever participated
in a means-tested program is highly correlated with program participation after job loss,
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and when included in the second covariate index, greatly diminishes the importance of
all other covariates. We plot the conditional probability of past welfare receipt in Appendix Figure 1 and argue that it passes a simple eye test for smoothness, especially
when compared to the visually striking discontinuities in our main outcomes discussed
in Section 5. The last row of Table 2 shows the estimated discontinuity, which is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for some bandwidths. However, note that the
estimated discontinuity is positive: Workers above the UI eligibility threshold, if anything, are more likely to have participated in means-tested programs in the past. To the
extent that past program participation is positively correlated with future program participation, and UI eligibility has a negative effect on program participation, the estimated
outcome discontinuities will be biased towards zero.
UI Eligibility (First Stage)
In this section, we show that crossing the high quarter earnings threshold has an impact
on UI eligibility. A claimant is eligible for UI if she is monetarily eligible, and not
disqualified due to a firing or quit. Because our sample consists only of UI claimants,
the “treatment” in all the analyses below is eligibility for the minimum weekly benefit at
the beginning of the unemployment spell, conditional on filing a UI claim. In Figure 3,
we plot the probability of eligibility against the claimants’ (normalized) highest quarter
earnings in the previous five quarters. The graph shows a large increase in eligibility by
45 percentage points once a claimant’s high quarter earnings exceed the threshold.
The probability of UI eligibility does not reach one to the right of the threshold for
two reasons. First, it is possible for a worker to have high quarter earnings that exceed
the minimum requirement but be monetarily ineligible because base period earnings are
less than 1.5 times the high quarter earnings. Second, even if a claimant is monetarily
eligible, she could be disqualified if she quits her job or was fired for cause. We find
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that, of the claimants above the threshold who are ineligible in our sample, 20 percent
failed to meet the spread requirement for monetary eligibility and 59 percent quit or
were fired from their previous jobs. The rest of the excess eligibility to the left of the
cutoff and ineligibility to the right of the cutoff (about 13 percent of claims) may be
due to misreporting of wages by employers. For example, if a claimant’s earnings were
underreported in the wage records, she can ask that her earnings be verified with her
employers in UI covered sectors. Additional earnings that are validated would be added
to the base period earnings and could result in monetary eligibility, but the quarterly
wage records would not necessarily be corrected.
Estimates of the first stage discontinuities are presented in the first column of Table
3, Panel A, using a bandwidth of $700. In Appendix Table 1, we show that the 45 percentage point increase in UI eligibility is robust to different bandwidth choices. Finally,
because we will be focusing on the short and long duration subsamples in the analysis below, we also report the first stages for these subsamples in the second and third
columns of Table 3.
5

RESULTS

Employment Effects
In this section, we present graphical evidence as well as formal estimates of the effect of
UI eligibility on employment. To begin, Figure 4 plots binned averages of the duration
of initial nonemployment spells (in quarters) against high quarter earnings categories.
The initial nonemployment duration is defined as the number of consecutive calendar
quarters after the filing of the UI claim in which no earnings are reported, up to 10
quarters. We find a clear discontinuity at the UI eligibility threshold, with workers who
fall just above working approximately three fewer weeks (0.23 quarters) than those who
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fall just below the cutoff. In the first column of Table 3, Panel B, we report the RD
estimate of the duration effect using a local linear regression with a bandwidth of $700.
We find that eligibility to receive UI increases the duration of nonemployment by about
half a quarter, or 20 percent.
As previously mentioned, the “treatment” of UI eligibility varied over the analysis
period due to legislated increases in the potential duration of benefits during the Great
Recession: UI-eligible workers who separated from their jobs prior to 2008 had potential durations of up to 26 weeks, while those who separated during the recession had
potential durations of up to 99 weeks. To see how the impact of UI eligibility varied in
the two periods, we analyze the effects separately for the short and long duration subsamples described in data section above. The RD estimates for these subsamples are
presented in the second and third columns of Table 3. For the short duration subsample,
UI eligibility increases nonemployment durations by roughly 13 percent, whereas for
the long duration subsample, the effect is closer to 25 percent. The last row of Panel
B translates this into an average loss of $444 (5 percent) and $1,224 (14 percent) over
the subsequent two and half years, for the short and long duration subsamples, respectively. In Appendix Tables 1, 2, and 3, we present these estimates using a variety of
bandwidths. Looking across the columns in Appendix Tables 1-3, we see that estimates
and significance levels are relatively robust to bandwidth choice. The two bandwidth
selectors and robust confidence intervals suggest that in the pooled sample, duration effects are approximately 0.54-0.62, and earnings losses are $875-$922, with both ranges
slightly higher but similar to the point estimates in Table 1.
Thus far, we have shown that UI eligibility increases nonemployment durations, and
that the effects are stronger when there are longer potential UI durations. We now explore how the effects evolve over the jobless spell, focusing on the periods before and
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after UI exhaustion. In Figure 5, we plot the impact of UI eligibility on the probability
of being employed in each quarter relative to the UI claim for each of the two subsamples. Each point on the graph represents RD estimate τ̂ from Equation (3), where the
outcomes are indicators for having positive earnings in a certain quarter, and the vertical
dashed line indicates the quarter at which UI is exhausted for claimants with 26 weeks of
regular benefits. The bandwidth used for estimating each of these estimates is $700.19
For short duration claims (Panel A), we find that UI eligibility only has a significant
negative effect on employment in the first quarter after the claim.20 In contrast, Panel B
shows that the employment effects for long duration claims are larger and persist even
after UI is exhausted.
The first two columns of Table 4 present the above results numerically, along with the
estimated intercept right below the threshold for comparison. For short duration claims,
UI eligibility results in a 4.9 percentage point difference (9 percent decrease) in the
probability of being employed in the first quarter. For the long duration subsample, we
find that UI eligibility decreases the probability of employment for at least 10 quarters.
In each of the first 9 quarters, there is approximately a 7 percentage point decrease
(13-14 percent) in employment. The last two columns present these in effects in terms
of earnings differences: UI eligibility decreases earnings by $13.92 (insignificant) and
$169.48 (18 percent) in the first quarter after the UI claim, for the short and long duration
subsamples, respectively.
Though it is tempting to interpret the difference in results between the short and long
duration subsamples as the causal impact of potential UI durations, one should exercise
caution in doing so. It is important to note that a major difference between the two
19 Appendix

Figure 2 presents the discontinuities visually for several time periods.
there also appear to be significantly negative effects on employment even after benefit
exhaustion, the coefficients are not jointly significant.
20 Although
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subsamples is that claimants in the long duration subsample lost their jobs during the
Great Recession. To the extent that the responsiveness to UI benefits varies with economic conditions, the difference between the two samples encompasses both the effect
of potential UI durations, as well as the effects of the business cycle. Recent evidence
on how the responsiveness to UI changes during downturns has been mixed: Kroft and
Notowidigdo (2014) find that durations are less responsive; Card et al. (2015a) find that
durations are more responsive; and Schmieder et al. (2012) find that the responsiveness
remains roughly stable over the cycle.21
Finally, we attempt to relate our estimates of the duration effects to those of the previous literature. As mentioned above, the focus of numerous studies conducted over
the last few decades has been on marginal increases in benefit levels or potential durations, rather than on UI eligibility itself. Although it is difficult to directly compare
our results to this literature, as a way to gauge the size of our estimates, we can think
of UI eligibility as either a large increase in the benefit level or potential duration. If
the thought experiment is that ineligibles receive a zero percent replacement rate for the
usual duration of benefits, our estimates indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in
replacement rates leads to a 0.8 (short duration sample) to a 1.4 week (long duration
sample) increase in jobless durations. If instead the thought experiment is that ineligible workers receive the same nonzero replacement rate as eligibles for zero weeks,
our estimates suggest that a one-week increase in potential benefit duration increases
jobless durations by 0.09 (long duration sample) to 0.16 weeks (short duration sample).
Although the employment effect of UI eligibility is likely a combination of benefit level
and duration effects (i.e., Lalive et al., 2006), both ranges of estimates are surprisingly
consistent with those found in the recent literature. In terms of the benefit level effects,
21 Note,

durations.

however, that the outcome in Card et al. (2015a) is UI durations rather than nonemployment
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the most widely cited estimate is that of Meyer (1990), who finds that UI durations
increase by 1.5 weeks for every 10 percentage point increase in the replacement rate.
Recent reexamination of this effect using the same data as in Meyer (1990) concludes
that by better controlling for past earnings, the estimate is closer to 0.9 weeks (Landais,
forthcoming). In terms of potential duration effects, the lower range of our estimates,
0.09, is quite consistent with quasi-experimental evidence from the United States (Card
and Levine, 2000 find an effect of 0.07), Austria (Card et al., 2007 find an effect of 0.1),
and Germany (Schmieder et al., 2012 find an effect of 0.1).
Program Interaction Effects
We now turn to the effects of UI eligibility on participation in means-tested programs.
As noted in the introduction, workers who are affected by policies that expand UI eligibility tend to be low-earning workers, who may be more likely to rely on several
social safety net programs. Therefore, in addition to examining the effects of UI on
employment, we also look at how workers who are eligible for UI differ in terms of
means-tested benefit receipt.
We begin by examining the effects of UI eligibility on participation in means-tested
programs in the quarter after UI claim filing. In Figures 6, 7, and 8, we plot the fraction
of UI claimants receiving benefits from each program for each high quarter earnings bin.
Figure 6 shows a clear drop of about 2 percentage points in the probability of TANF
receipt for workers above the eligibility threshold. In contrast, the analogous plots for
SNAP and Medicaid show no difference in benefit receipt from these two programs
between those above and below the threshold.
As in the previous results for employment, we also examine the effect of UI eligibility on program participation at various points relative to job loss. In particular, we
are interested in the longer run effects of UI eligibility: If UI has a negative effect on
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TANF participation right after job loss, does it persist once UI benefits are exhausted? If
so, there are potentially long term benefits associated with UI eligibility from lowering
dependence on cash assistance. On the other hand, it is possible that UI simply delays
workers’ enrollment in TANF.
To examine the effects of UI eligibility over time, we estimate again Equation (3),
but with outcome Yi being an indicator for whether individual i received benefits from
a specific welfare program in a certain quarter relative to the UI claim, separately for
our short and long duration subsamples. Figures 9, 10, and, 11 plot the RD estimates
τ̂ against the quarter relative to the UI claim quarter.22 Panel A of Figure 9 shows
that in the short potential duration subsample, UI eligibles are significantly less likely
to receive benefits from TANF in the first quarter, but the gap disappears after UI is
exhausted (denoted by the dashed vertical line). Panel B shows that when UI durations
are longer, the gap in TANF participation persists for approximately as long as the UI
potential duration, suggesting that the availability of UI simply delays the receipt of
TANF for the duration of UI benefits, rather than permanently deters participants from
welfare. Analogous figures for SNAP and Medicaid are shown in Figures 10 and 11,
respectively. In general, we do not see similarly strong patterns in SNAP and Medicaid
enrollment corresponding to the beginning and expiration of UI benefits.
The first six columns of Table 5 present the numerical estimates corresponding to
these graphs, as well as the estimated intercepts right below the threshold (β̂0 ) for comparison. Panel A reports the results for the short duration subsample and Panel B reports
the results for the long duration subsample. In the short duration subsample, being
above the UI eligibility threshold decreases the probability of participating in TANF by
3.9 percentage points (42 percent) in the first quarter after layoff, 2.1 percentage points
22 Appendix

Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the discontinuities for several time periods.
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(24 percent) in the second, and insignificantly after that. For claims with a potential
duration of roughly eight quarters, a gap of roughly 4 percentage points (62 percent)
persists for about eight quarters, after which the difference is insignificant.
The last four columns of Table 5 presents these results in terms of dollars of benefits
received from TANF and SNAP per quarter. In the short duration subsample, the effect
of UI on TANF benefits in the first quarter is approximately $50, and is significant for
two quarters, while for the long duration subsample, the initial effect is a roughly similar
magnitude at $53, but persists for eight quarters. Effects for SNAP are slightly smaller
in magnitude, with an initial drop of approximately $35 and $44, for short and long
duration subsamples, respectively. However, the estimates are much more imprecise
than those for TANF. The magnitudes indicate that although there is a large impact of
UI on TANF, very few UI claimants participate in TANF in the first place (roughly 8
percent), resulting in relatively small overall effects. Though a much larger proportion
of claimants enroll in SNAP and Medicaid (roughly 30 to 40 percent) in this sample, UI
does not significantly affect participation.
The above results suggest that any effects of UI on means-tested programs all but
disappear within two years. To summarize our program interaction results, Panel C of
Table 3 shows the estimated effects of UI eligibility on dollars of TANF benefits, dollars
of SNAP benefits, and months of Medicaid benefits received over the subsequent two
years. Pooling together claims of all potential durations, UI eligibility results in a $230
(40 percent) drop in TANF benefits over two years, with no significant difference in
SNAP benefits and Medicaid months. In columns (2) and (3), we break the estimates
down by UI potential duration, and find nearly all of the TANF benefit difference is
driven by the long duration subsample. Panel C of Appendix Tables 1-3 shows that
these effects are generally robust to bandwidth choice.
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Since welfare programs are historically targeted at single mothers (especially TANF),
we examine the effects by gender in Appendix Table 4.23 We find that the entire effect
on TANF is driven by females, which is consistent with the fact that TANF generally
aids single mothers. However, we still do not find significant effects for either Medicaid
or SNAP.
Because TANF, SNAP, and Medicaid differ significantly in the types of benefits
provided, coverage populations, and program rules, it is difficult to fully pinpoint the
reasons for the different patterns of results. However, we highlight several key differences between each program that may explain why we find strong effects of UI on TANF
relative to the other two programs. First, since unearned income in TANF is subject to
a 100 percent reduction rate, TANF benefits are more significantly reduced by UI eligibility than SNAP benefits (30 percent reduction) and Medicaid (not reduced). To the
extent that participation in means-tested programs is costly (Currie, 2006), the low benefit level may reduce take-up of TANF among UI eligibles. Second, TANF has strict
lifetime time limits while the other programs do not, which can further reduce TANF
participation among UI eligibles, as it might not be worthwhile for workers to “use up”
a month of TANF when benefits are offset by UI. This behavior would be consistent
with Grogger (2002) and Grogger and Michalopoulos (2003), who show that welfare
recipients conserve months of benefits in response to lifetime limits. A third complementary reason is that more stringent work requirements for TANF make the program
more onerous and costly than SNAP and Medicaid. Finally, it is possible that since
TANF provides cash assistance rather than in-kind benefits, workers may consider it
more as a substitute for UI payments than the benefits from other programs.
23 Although

we observe number of dependents, it is likely understated, as only individuals who claim
dependents for tax withholding purposes are observed to have dependents. Estimates of effects for the subset of claims who are observed to have dependents are in the Appendix Table 5. Estimates for claimants
without dependents were not very different from estimates on the whole sample.
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Effects of UI Eligibility on Total Income
The results of the previous section show when workers are eligible for UI, income from
other sources (employment and other social assistance) decrease. In this section, we
gauge the relative size of these reductions by comparing the total incomes of workers
above and below the UI eligibility threshold, where total income includes labor market
earnings, TANF and SNAP benefits, and UI payments. To the extent that this measure of
income captures differences in consumption, this exercise sheds light on the consumption smoothing benefits of UI eligibility.
We construct a quarterly measure of total income as the sum of earnings, benefits
from TANF and SNAP, and UI, adding each one at a time to get a sense of the relative
contributions of each type of income. For each income measure and each quarter, we
estimate Equation (1) using a bandwidth of $700. In Figures 12 and 13, we plot the
point estimates of the intercept terms, β̂0 and β̂0 + τ̂y , against time relative to the claim
date. The lower intercept (β̂0 ) represents the income for claimants who just miss the
threshold while the upper intercept (β̂0 + τ̂y ) represents the income of those just above
the threshold. We conduct the analyses separately for the two duration subsamples.
These plots represent the same information as in Tables 4 and 5, but give a better sense
of the how large the RD effects are relative to each other and to preseparation earnings.
For both subsamples, because we do not observe the exact timing of UI payments
within the benefit year, we assume in this exercise that claimants receive the weekly
benefit amount every week after filing a claim, up to the observed total benefits received.
Furthermore, as detailed in the Appendix, in the long duration subsample, we impute the
UI income beyond the second quarter after layoff because we do not observe the total
amount of EB or EUC benefits received. Since we are most interested in the immediate
consumption smoothing effects of UI, we emphasize the (nonimputed) results from the
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first and second quarters after layoff in the analysis below.
The upper plot of Figure 12 shows that earnings drop from about $1,750 one quarter before layoff by approximately $650 (36 percent) one quarter after layoff, both for
workers above and below the UI threshold. This initial drop in earnings associated with
job loss is similar to that found in the seminal work by Jacobson et al. (1993). After
the layoff, although there is a significant difference in employment in the first quarter
between the two groups, there is no difference in overall earnings. Earnings appear to
catch up to pre-layoff levels within six quarters for both groups, which is much faster
than documented in other studies, potentially due to our focus on low earners, who are
younger than previously studied displaced workers.24 In the middle panel, we add income from TANF and SNAP. The drop in income from one quarter before to one quarter
after layoff is mitigated somewhat, to about 28 percent, but not differentially for the two
groups. Finally, when we add UI income (bottom panel), we find that workers above
the threshold experience about a 5 percent drop in income in the first quarter post layoff
relative to preseparation, whereas workers below the threshold experience a 20 percent
drop, a difference of approximately $300.
In Figure 13, we similarly analyze the incomes of long potential duration claimants.
The upper panel shows that for workers above the UI eligibility threshold, earnings drop
by approximately 61 percent in the quarter after layoff. The analogous drop for workers
just below the threshold is 58 percent. While those below the threshold earn more in
all periods after layoff, the difference is small when compared to the magnitude of the
initial loss in earnings. For both groups, earnings do not reach pre-layoff levels even
10 quarters later. The relatively large initial drop and slow rebound for these workers,
24 In Jacobson et al. (1993) and Couch and Placzek (2010) earnings do not reach predisplacement levels

even six years post-displacement. Kawano and LaLumia (2015) find that earnings rebound slightly faster
using tax return data.

28

compared to those in Figure 12, is consistent with Davis and von Wachter (2011), who
find that workers who are laid off during recessions experience larger earnings losses.
The middle panel shows that TANF and SNAP mitigates the income drop to about 48
and 43 percent for those above and below the threshold, respectively. By comparing
the top and middle graphs, we find that although there are significant differences in
TANF receipt between UI eligibles and ineligibles, they are barely perceptible when
considered relative to other income. Finally, in the bottom panel, when we include UI
payments (which are imputed as described above after the second quarter), we find that
claimants above the UI threshold experience a 14 percent drop in income in the first
quarter, whereas those below the threshold experience a 34 percent drop.
When we break down the incomes into their different components, we find that
the “gain” of $621 in UI income for those just above the threshold is offset by only
$129 (21 percent) in reduced earnings and other social assistance in the long duration
subsample.25 Although this estimate corresponds to the effect of UI at the beginning
of the unemployment spell, it is only slightly smaller than the finding in Rothstein and
Valletta (2014), where a loss of UI benefits at UI exhaustion is offset by 31 percent
through increases in earnings and social assistance payments.
We close this section with a discussion of how income differences between UI eligibles and ineligibles are informative of the consumption impact of UI eligibility. One
possibility is that while ineligibles experience larger negative income shocks, they are
able to smooth consumption by drawing down savings or borrowing. However, as shown
by Meyer and Sullivan (2006) for a similar population (low-educated mothers), lowearning workers are unlikely have substantial assets or access to credit. Consistent with
this, Browning and Crossley (2001) find that consumption smoothing benefits of UI
25 For

the short duration subsample, the UI gain of $347 is offset by $40 (12 percent) lost from other
income sources, though the estimate is statistically insignificant.
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are largest for those without liquid assets. Another possibility is intra-household consumption smoothing. Although our data do not allow us to observe households, some
recent studies using tax return (Kawano and LaLumia, 2015) and survey (Rothstein and
Valletta, 2014) data find that earnings from other household members do not respond
appreciably with UI benefits, while others suggest that responses might differ depending on which spouse becomes unemployed (Kawano and LaLumia, 2014 and Cullen
and Gruber, 2000). Finally, other income sources we do not observe include disability
insurance benefits, social security, and early retirement income, though evidence on interactions with UI are mixed or nonexistent (Lindner, forthcoming, Rutledge, 2012, and
Mueller et al., 2013).
Social Welfare Impact of Expanding UI Eligibility
In this section, we consider the social welfare impacts of a policy that expands UI eligibility to workers by lowering the earnings threshold. As in an optimal UI analysis
(i.e., Baily, 1978 and Chetty, 2008), we argue that the costs of such a policy come from
increased durations of joblessness, which must be balanced with consumption smoothing benefits. One difference between our model and the previously mentioned optimal
UI studies is that we assume workers’ consumption during unemployment comes from
means-tested programs as well as UI, which some studies have begun to do as well
(Saporta-Eksten, 2014 and Haan and Prowse, 2015). As in Chetty (2008), we use empirically estimated quantities that capture the costs and benefits of shifting the eligibility
threshold to determine whether it is locally optimal.
In the Appendix, we present a framework that formalizes the above points. In the
model, workers are initially unemployed with exogenously assigned previous earnings
that determine whether they qualify for UI. Conditional on UI eligibility, workers choose
the duration of unemployment for the subsequent period. All workers receive the same
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reemployment wage and pay a lump sum tax upon reemployment that finances all social benefits. Since the value of unemployment is higher for UI-eligible workers, they
have longer unemployment spells. A social planner selects the UI eligibility threshold
to maximize the expected utility of the unemployed, subject to a balanced budget constraint. The first order condition of the planner problem reveals that the social benefit of
marginally expanding eligibility from its current level is quantified by the difference in
the consumption utility between the UI-eligible and ineligible. The social cost is quantified by the difference in benefits paid out to the UI eligible versus ineligible, as well as
the difference in taxes received due to longer unemployment spells.
We calibrate the model using a CRRA utility function with varying levels of relative
risk aversion and observed empirical quantities from our data. Our main assumption is
that earnings, UI, and welfare benefits are the only sources of income, and that workers consume all of their income. Although we do not observe households in our data,
we also calibrate the model under the assumption that individuals live in two-worker
households, where both workers earn the same amount. We find that for a coefficient
of relative risk aversion γ ≥ 1.02, it is welfare-enhancing to lower the UI threshold.
Chetty and Szeidl (2007) provide evidence that the relevant value of risk aversion for
unemployment shocks can be as high as γ = 4 in a model with consumption commitments. Therefore, based on this simple calibration exercise, we conclude that lowering
the eligibility threshold would be socially beneficial.
There are several important aspects of the eligibility expansion problem that we
ignore in our simple analysis. First, we assume that workers and employers are not able
to manipulate earnings or timing of layoffs in order gain or avoid UI eligibility. While
we do not find evidence of these behaviors in our data (i.e., bunching at the threshold),
Baker and Rea Jr. (1998) has documented increased employment hazards when workers
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meet UI eligibility requirements in Canada.
A second important caveat is that we abstract from the effects of changing the UI
eligibility threshold on UI take-up. In our model, we assume that all unemployed workers apply for UI benefits, when in reality, the filing rate for UI is quite low: Wandner
and Stettner (2000) find that the percent of unemployed who applied for UI was approximately 46 percent in 1993. They further find that among the nonfilers, approximately
33 percent did not apply because of perceived ineligibility due to not having worked
enough. Therefore, it is likely that loosening eligibility requirements will increase the
number of people who file for UI, especially among those with relatively low earnings.
Finally, we have abstracted from important aspects of TANF and SNAP that may be
consequential for welfare analysis. First, we have assumed that they perfectly substitute
for UI benefits when this is not the case in reality. SNAP benefits, of course, can only be
used for food consumption. TANF benefits are different from UI in that there are lifetime
time limits and stringent work requirements associated with participation. Therefore,
we are likely understating the utility difference between UI eligibles and ineligibles.
Second, in our analysis, we have completely ignored the fact that welfare programs are
only available to certain groups of individuals, assuming instead that the average welfare
benefit is consumed by all workers. However, if only some workers are able to access
cash or food assistance, there are potential social benefits from equalizing consumption
across groups when the UI eligibility threshold is lowered. A final point is that we
assume a single government entity provides all social benefits, when in fact assistance
programs are financed differently and administered by several levels of government.
Investigating the potential redistributive consequences (across workers and across levels
of government) of this policy is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future study.
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6

CONCLUSION

This paper explores the impact of UI eligibility on the incomes of low-earning workers,
accounting for changes in earnings and other social assistance. Using a regression discontinuity design around the UI earnings threshold, we find that UI eligibility increases
jobless durations by about 4 weeks (13 percent increase) and 8.9 weeks (25 percent
increase) before and during the Great Recession, respectively. We also find that UI eligibility lowered benefits from TANF, but not from SNAP and Medicaid. Our preferred
estimate suggests that UI eligibility lowers the probability of TANF receipt by approximately 42-63 percent immediately after layoff, but that the effect is likely temporary.
Although we find significant effects of UI eligibility on employment and income
from means-tested programs, the overall impact of UI on workers’ incomes is positive
and large. Accounting for the components of income that we observe (earnings, UI,
and means-tested benefits), those who fall just above the UI eligibility threshold have
approximately $500 more income following job separation. This result points to a significant “hole” in the social safety net for workers who are ineligible for UI benefits, as
only a small portion of the difference between UI eligibles and ineligibles is made up
for by other forms of social assistance.
Finally, returning to our motivating question, in a simple calibration exercise, we
considered the welfare impacts of a policy in which the UI eligibility threshold is shifted
downward to cover more workers. We find that, balancing the consumption smoothing
benefits with the potential cost of longer jobless durations, the policy is welfare enhancing for realistic values of risk aversion. The results from this exercise suggests
that policies of state UI programs such as those incentivized in the UI modernization
provisions of the ARRA will yield net positive benefits to society.
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Figure 2: Predicted Outcomes Using Predetermined Covariates
A. Predicted Probability of Employment in First Quarter
Figure 1: Density of Claims Around Eligibility Threshold

B. Predicted Probability of TANF, SNAP or Medicaid Receipt in First Quarter
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Notes: This figure plots the number of UI claimants in each non-overlapping $15
interval of (normalized) high quarter earnings. The vertical line denotes the minimum
earnings threshold.

Notes: These figures summarize the relationship between observable predetermined
characteristics and high quarter earnings of UI claimants. The graphs are constructed by
first predicting the probability of being employed or of receiving benefits from any meanstested program in the first quarter after layoff using linear probability models with gender,
industry, number of dependents, education, race, age, tenure, county, previous earnings,
and year as predictors. For each outcome, the mean predicted value is plotted against nonoverlapping high quarter earnings categories. The vertical line denotes the minimum
earnings threshold.

Figure 3: Probability of UI Eligibility (First Stage)

Notes: This figure plots the proportion of UI claimants eligible to receive UI payments in each non-overlapping
$75 interval of the (normalized) high quarter earnings. The vertical line denotes the minimum earnings threshold.

Figure 4: Duration of Initial Nonemployment Spell

Notes: This figure plots the mean number of consecutive quarters in which UI claimants received no earnings by
each category of high quarter earnings. The vertical line denotes the minimum earnings threshold.
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Figure 5: RD Estimates of Employment Effects Over Time
A. Short Potential Duration

B. Long Potential Duration

Notes: This figure plots fuzzy RD estimates of the effect of UI eligibility on the probability of being
employed in a certain quarter relative to the claim quarter. Each RD estimate is obtained using the
local linear regression specification in Equation (3), with a bandwidth of $700. The upper plot is
restricted to the short potential duration subsample, and the bottom panel is restricted to the long
potential duration subsample. See text for details. The dash-dot lines denotes 95% confidence
intervals, and the vertical dashed line indicates UI exhaustion.
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Figure 6: TANF Participation in the First Quarter After Layoff

Notes: This figure plots the fraction of UI claimants who received TANF benefits in the first quarter after the UI
claim for each high quarter earnings category. The vertical line denotes the minimum earnings threshold.

Figure 7: SNAP Participation in the First Quarter After Layoff

Notes: This figure plots the fraction of UI claimants who received SNAP benefits in the first quarter after the UI
claim for each high quarter earnings category. The vertical line denotes the minimum earnings threshold.
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Figure 9: RD Estimates of TANF Participation Effects Over Time
A. Short Potential Duration
Figure 8: Medicaid Participation in the First Quarter After Layoff

B. Long Potential Duration
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Notes: This figure plots the fraction of UI claimants who were enrolled in Medicaid in
the first quarter after the UI claim for each high quarter earnings category. The vertical
line denotes the minimum earnings threshold.

Notes: This figure plots fuzzy RD estimates of the effect of UI eligibility on probability of
TANF benefit receipt in a certain quarter relative to the claim quarter. Each RD estimate is
obtained using the local linear regression specification in Equation (3), with a bandwidth
of $700. The upper plot is restricted to the short potential duration subsample, and the
bottom panel is restricted to the long potential duration subsample. See text for details.
The dash-dot lines denotes 95% confidence intervals, and the vertical dashed line
indicates UI exhaustion.

Figure 11: RD Estimates of Medicaid Participation Effects Over Time

A. Short Potential Duration

A. Short Potential Duration

B. Long Potential Duration

B. Long Potential Duration

Notes: This figure plots fuzzy RD estimates of the effect of UI eligibility on probability of
SNAP benefit receipt in a certain quarter relative to the claim quarter. Each RD estimate is
obtained using the local linear regression specification in Equation (3), with a bandwidth of
$700. The upper plot is restricted to the short potential duration subsample, and the bottom
panel is restricted to the long potential duration subsample. See text for details. The dashdot lines denotes 95% confidence intervals, and the vertical dashed line indicates UI
exhaustion.

Notes: This figure plots fuzzy RD estimates of the effect of UI eligibility on probability of
Medicaid participation in a certain quarter relative to the claim quarter. Each RD estimate
is obtained using the local linear regression specification in Equation (3), with a bandwidth
of $700. The upper plot is restricted to the short potential duration subsample, and the
bottom panel is restricted to the long potential duration subsample. See text for details. The
dash-dot lines denotes 95% confidence intervals, and the vertical dashed line indicates UI
exhaustion.
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Figure 10: RD Estimates of SNAP Participation Effects Over Time

Figure 12: Income Over Time (Short Potential UI Duration)
A. Earnings Only

B. Earnings, TANF, and SNAP Benefits

C. Earnings, TANF, SNAP, and UI Benefits

Notes: The graphs in this figure show point estimates of β₀ and β₀+τy from Equation (1), where Yi are different measures of
income in each quarter. Each local linear regression uses a bandwidth of $700. In Panel A, Yi include earnings; in Panel B,
TANF and the cash-equivalent of SNAP benefits are added; and in Panel C, UI benefits are added.
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Figure 13: Income Over Time (Long Potential UI Duration)
A. Earnings Only

B. Earnings, TANF, and SNAP Benefits

C. Earnings, TANF, SNAP, and UI Benefits

Notes: The graphs in this figure show point estimates of β₀ and β₀+τy from Equation (1), where Yi are different measures of
income in each quarter. Each local linear regression uses a bandwidth of $700. In Panel A, Yi include earnings; in Panel B,
TANF and the cash-equivalent of SNAP benefits are added; and in Panel C, UI benefits are added.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Demographic Characteristics
Female
Age
Education
Less Than HS
High School
Some College
Bachelor Degree
Adv. Degree
Race
White
Black
Asian
Native American/Alaskan
Has Dependents
Employment and Program Participation Before Layoff
Prev. Job Tenure (Months)
Previous Industry
Manufacturing
Retail
Support/Waste
Accomodations and Food Svcs.
Previous Year Earnings
[std. dev.]
Ever Claimed UI (since 2001)
Ever Received Benefits from…
TANF
SNAP/Food Stamps
Medicaid

All
(1)

RD Sample
(2)

40.7%
39.1

57.4%
33.1

11.0%
49.7%
25.6%
7.9%
5.4%

18.5%
50.3%
24.2%
3.7%
2.6%

61.9%
13.1%
1.1%
1.1%
24.9%

50.9%
19.7%
0.7%
1.5%
25.6%

66.80
[92.09]

22.58
[39.86]

22.8%
11.0%
10.0%
7.2%
36847.61
[33316.47]
27.3%

5.2%
22.2%
15.0%
24.3%
7696.36
[4103.81]
24.9%

5.2%
19.4%
16.6%

15.2%
45.6%
41.6%

2.06
[3.47]
76.2%

2.66
[3.72]
43.9%

2.1%
17.4%
12.6%

6.1%
38.9%
30.9%

Employment and Program Participation After Layoff
Num. of Jobless Quarters
[std. dev.]
UI Recipient
Received benefits one quarter after layoff
TANF
SNAP/Food Stamps
Medicaid
Number of months on… (Over Next 2 Years)
TANF
[std. dev.]
SNAP/Food Stamps
[std. dev.]
Medicaid
[std. dev.]
(Conditional on receipt) Quarterly income received from …
TANF
[std. dev.]
SNAP/Food Stamps
[std. dev.]

0.40
[2.30]
3.84
[7.34]
2.80
[6.69]

1.14
[3.88]
8.20
[9.38]
6.50
[9.21]

961.09
[689.52]
785.14
[604.21]

970.51
[682.86]
847.91
[597.37]

N

2,001,462

286,113

Notes: Data are administrative records from Michigan, 2005-2010. The sample for column (1) consists of all "new" UI
claims (i.e., who have not claimed UI for the past two years). Column (2) contains only those within $1500 of the eligibility
threshold. Standard deviations are in brackets. All monetary amounts are in 2012 dollars.
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Table 2: Local Linear Estimates of Discontinuities in Pre-determined Covariates

$1,500
(1)

$1,000
(2)

Bandwidth
$700
(3)

$500
(4)

$300
(5)

Predicted Prob.
of Employment in 1st Qtr
Predicted Prob. Of MeansTested Program in 1st Qtr

0.002 ***
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.002)

0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)

0.001
(0.001)
0.002
(0.002)

0.000
(0.001)
0.003
(0.003)

0.000
(0.001)
0.004
(0.003)

Female

-0.002
(0.004)
-0.004 **
(0.002)
0.003
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.004)
0.068
(0.104)
0.397
(0.294)

0.003
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.000
(0.004)
0.004
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.004)
-0.006
(0.005)
0.060
(0.126)
0.775 **
(0.354)

0.006
(0.005)
0.000
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.004)
-0.006
(0.005)
0.059
(0.149)
0.650
(0.415)

0.006
(0.006)
0.000
(0.003)
0.000
(0.005)
-0.003
(0.006)
0.003
(0.005)
-0.005
(0.006)
0.108
(0.175)
0.797
(0.490)

0.009
(0.008)
0.000
(0.003)
-0.005
(0.007)
0.009
(0.007)
0.010
(0.006)
-0.008
(0.008)
0.091
(0.226)
0.981
(0.625)

0.002
(0.004)

0.005
(0.005)

0.011 **
(0.005)

0.013 **
(0.006)

0.007
(0.008)

Manufacturing
Retail
Accomodation
and Food Services
Less than HS
White
Age
Prev. Job Tenure (Months)

Has Received Means-Tested
Program Benefits in Past

Notes: Each table entry corresponds to an estimate of τy of Equation (1) from separate regressions, using bandwidths of
$1500, $1000, $700, $500, and $300. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the person level. *p<0.10,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 3: Local Linear Estimates of First Stage and Main Outcome Discontinuities: By UI Duration
By UI Potential Duration
Short
Long
(2)
(3)

All
(1)
A. First Stage
UI Eligible
Value Right Below Thr.
B. Fuzzy RD Estimates: Employment
Initial Nonemployment Duration (Qtrs)
Value Right Below Thr.
Percent Impact
Earnings (Over 2.5 Years)
Value Right Below Thr.
Percent Impact

0.449 ***
(0.004)
0.102

0.403 ***
(0.007)
0.109

0.484 ***
(0.007)
0.100

0.514 ***
(0.090)
2.566
20%

0.322 **
(0.161)
2.529
13%

0.682 ***
(0.140)
2.753
25%

-834.82 ***
(272.14)
8950.78
-9%

-444.13
(532.82)
9179.03
-5%

-1224.66 ***
(378.65)
8715.79
-14%

C.Fuzzy RD Estimates: Program Participation (Over Next 2 Years)
Dollars of TANF Benefits
Value Right Below Thr.
Percent Impact
Dollars of SNAP Benefits
Value Right Below Thr.
Percent Impact
Months of Medicaid Benefits
Value Right Below Thr.
Percent Impact
N

-229.74 ***
(46.72)
571.75
-40%

-42.29
(95.82)
705.91
-6%

-345.76 ***
(62.58)
481.14
-72%

-114.91
(91.64)
2679.88
-4%

-59.49
(143.83)
2126.07
-3%

-210.68
(157.23)
3385.95
-6%

-0.048
(0.227)
7.023
-1%

0.281
(0.422)
7.339
4%

-0.430
(0.347)
7.275
-6%

137,708

55,435

50,250

Notes: Panel A reports estimates of τd from Equation (2) and panels B and C report RD
estimates τ from Equation (3), where each entry is obtained using separate regressions. The
values right below the threshold are point estimates of intercept terms β₀ from Equation (1).
All regressions use a bandwidth of $700. See text for descriptions of the subsamples for
columns (2) and (3). Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the person level.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 4: Fuzzy RD Estimates of UI Eligibility on Employment and Earnings Over Time
Panel A: Short Potential Duration Subsample (N=55,435)
Prob. Employed
Earnings
Value
RD
Value
RD
at Thr.
Est.
at Thr.
Est.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.528
-0.049 **
1113.93
-13.92
(0.021)
(103.95)
2
0.554
-0.031
1467.53
-21.60
(0.021)
(110.80)
3
0.560
-0.016
1593.83
-0.25
(0.021)
(107.03)
4
0.555
-0.032
1627.84
-81.92
(0.021)
(117.81)
5
0.525
-0.024
1642.01
-177.98
(0.021)
(132.03)
6
0.529
-0.040 *
1733.91
-148.46
(0.021)
(127.89)
7
0.524
-0.034
1726.23
6.63
(0.021)
(125.83)
8
0.504
-0.041 *
1698.03
-176.48
(120.32)
(0.021)
9
0.486
-0.050 **
1617.48
-143.80
(0.021)
(118.82)
10
0.487
-0.038 *
1714.57
-189.14
(0.021)
(128.10)
Panel B: Long Potential Duration Subsample (N=50,250)

Qtrs
After
Claim
1

Qtrs
After
Claim
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Prob. Employed
Value
RD
at Thr.
Est.
(1)
(2)
0.472
-0.063 ***
(0.018)
0.516
-0.077 ***
(0.018)
0.534
-0.074 ***
(0.018)
0.536
-0.082 ***
(0.018)
0.518
-0.064 ***
(0.018)
0.541
-0.052 ***
(0.018)
0.552
-0.069 ***
(0.018)
0.551
-0.070 ***
(0.018)
0.538
-0.059 ***
(0.019)
0.547
-0.046 **
(0.020)

Earnings
RD
Est.
(4)
-169.48
(55.74)
1343.81
-218.67
(71.08)
1549.04
-261.55
(79.89)
1533.10
-185.67
(81.09)
1569.51
-220.32
(84.88)
1797.13
-168.96
(95.38)
1905.80
-222.53
(97.56)
1923.44
-317.87
(100.28)
1903.79
-197.81
(103.86)
2043.07
-117.50
(118.10)
Value
at Thr.
(3)
923.21

***
***
***
**
***
*
**
***
*

Notes: RD Est. are estimates of τ in Equation (3) and Value at Thr. is an estimate of β₀ in Equation (1), all from
separate regressions (bandwidth $700). The outcome variable is an indicator for any positive earnings (cols. (1)(2)) or earnings (cols. (3)-(4)). See text for details on subsamples in each panel. Standard errors are in
parentheses and clustered at the person level. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 5: Fuzzy RD Estimates of UI Eligibility on Means-Tested Program Use Over Time
Panel A: Short Potential Duration Subsample (N=55,435)

Qtrs
After
Claim
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Probability of Receiving…
TANF
SNAP
Medicaid
Value
RD
Value
RD
Value
RD
at Thr. Est.
at Thr. Est.
at Thr. Est.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
0.093
-0.039 *** 0.334
0.010
0.319
0.015
(0.012)
(0.020)
(0.020)
0.089
-0.021 *
0.330
0.019
0.316
0.017
(0.012)
(0.020)
(0.020)
0.087
-0.003
0.326
0.010
0.316
0.010
(0.012)
(0.020)
(0.020)
0.085
0.004
0.326
0.022
0.312
0.015
(0.012)
(0.020)
(0.020)
0.080
0.001
0.319
0.041 ** 0.308
0.019
(0.011)
(0.020)
(0.020)
0.075
0.004
0.321
0.049 ** 0.306
0.020
(0.011)
(0.020)
(0.020)
0.072
0.007
0.324
0.048 ** 0.307
0.007
(0.011)
(0.020)
(0.020)
0.074
0.001
0.340
0.023
0.310
0.001
(0.011)
(0.020)
(0.020)
0.073
0.001
0.344
0.042 ** 0.306
0.015
(0.011)
(0.020)
(0.020)
0.071
0.006
0.355
0.037 *
0.303
0.017
(0.011)
(0.020)
(0.020)

Income From…
TANF
SNAP
Value
RD
Value
RD
at Thr. Est.
at Thr. Est.
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
100.18 -50.26 *** 263.01
-34.70 *
(14.86)
(19.68)
98.23
-34.34 **
258.46
-20.18
(15.02)
(19.69)
93.66
-2.62
258.15
-16.25
(15.17)
(19.67)
89.06
15.50
256.30
-4.28
(15.05)
(19.74)
83.38
19.76
251.27
15.78
(15.00)
(19.87)
80.12
10.56
259.09
17.87
(14.45)
(20.67)
81.18
-0.53
278.57
-3.55
(14.57)
(21.65)
80.09
-0.36
301.23
-14.20
(14.37)
(22.79)
79.68
1.74
312.70
1.59
(14.50)
(23.49)
76.53
10.53
329.61
9.05
(14.18)
(24.47)

Panel B: Long Potential Duration Subsample (N=50,250)

Qtrs
After
Claim
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

TANF
Value
RD
at Thr. Est.
(1)
(2)
0.067
-0.042
(0.009)
0.068
-0.045
(0.009)
0.064
-0.038
(0.009)
0.065
-0.040
(0.009)
0.065
-0.041
(0.008)
0.059
-0.035
(0.008)
0.060
-0.035
(0.009)
0.061
-0.022
(0.011)
0.058
-0.019
(0.012)
0.044
0.010
(0.015)

Probability of Receiving…
SNAP
Medicaid
Value
RD
Value
RD
at Thr. Est.
at Thr. Est.
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
*** 0.470
-0.024
0.334 -0.010
(0.018)
(0.017)
*** 0.484
-0.034 *
0.339 -0.012
(0.018)
(0.017)
*** 0.485
-0.025
0.342 -0.020
(0.018)
(0.017)
*** 0.491
-0.029
0.342 -0.019
(0.018)
(0.017)
*** 0.479
-0.004
0.338 -0.013
(0.018)
(0.017)
*** 0.475
-0.005
0.330 -0.013
(0.019)
(0.018)
*** 0.473
-0.001
0.336 -0.027
(0.020)
(0.019)
** 0.481
0.004
0.338 -0.013
(0.023)
(0.022)
0.476
-0.020
0.332 -0.030
(0.026)
(0.024)
0.468
-0.026
0.323 -0.049
(0.033)
(0.030)

Income From…
TANF
SNAP
Value
RD
Value
RD
at Thr. Est.
at Thr. Est.
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
68.19
-52.99 *** 452.09
-44.29
(10.61)
(23.57)
68.12
-45.99 *** 479.07
-49.31
(10.81)
(24.24)
70.29
-50.22 *** 482.78
-41.30
(10.95)
(24.35)
69.31
-51.45 *** 478.10
-40.63
(10.61)
(24.23)
64.06
-45.36 *** 455.29
-4.26
(10.19)
(23.75)
58.35
-43.37 *** 437.27
-1.23
(10.02)
(23.70)
60.03
-43.25 *** 431.46
-1.33
(10.92)
(25.34)
57.38
-30.36 **
423.76
15.91
(12.00)
(27.79)
52.21
-16.20
403.00
-8.79
(13.48)
(30.50)
38.53
5.54
371.60
-20.28
(15.60)
(36.07)

*
**
*
*

Notes: RD Est. are estimates of τ in Equation (3) and Value at Thr. is an estimate of β₀ in Equation (1), all from separate regressions
(bandwidth $700). The outcomes are indicators for participating in (cols. (1)-(6)) or the amount received from a certain program (cols.
(7)-(10)). See text for details on subsamples in each panel. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the person level. *p<0.10,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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APPENDIX
Imputing UI Income
In this section, we describe the rationale and method for imputing UI income for the
exercise in the final part Section 5 of the main text.
First, although we are able to observe when each UI spell began, the weekly benefit
amount, and the total amount of regular UI benefits received over a one year period,
we do not observe the exact timing of UI payments. Therefore, to calculate the amount
of UI received per quarter, we assume that workers are eligible for the full amount of
UI benefits each week with no gaps in payments beginning with the claim date (i.e., 13
weeks times the weekly benefit amount per quarter), up to the observed total benefits
received.
Second, although we observe for each UI claimant the total amount of regular benefits received, we do not observe the total amount of UI benefits (i.e., including benefits
from EB or EUC programs) when an extended benefit period is in effect. Specifically,
even though the data contains a variable that should be the total weeks of extended benefits received, since each claim is only valid for one year, we do not observe workers
receiving more than 52 weeks of benefits in total, even when we know that claimants
could have collected up to 99 weeks of benefits.1 This would not be a problem for
the short duration subsample since no extended benefits were available. For the long
1 Furthermore,

even if the duration is less than 52 weeks, we believe the extended benefits variable
is understated for unknown reasons: For example, for claims made between October 2008 and August
2009, when federal EUC benefits were being rolled in, we observe that most claimants only received six
weeks of extended UI, even though they would have been eligible for at least the first tier of EUC, which
extends benefits by 13 weeks.
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duration subsample, however, the observed UI received after the second quarter (when
regular benefits are exhausted) would be greatly understated. For illustrative purposes,
we impute the UI income in the third and later quarters for the long duration sample
using a method described below. In both imputed and nonimputed measures of UI income, we do not incorporate payments from future UI claims. Since this is likely to
understate UI income in later quarters, this is yet another reason to focus on the quarters
immediately following layoff.
To obtain an approximate measure of UI income beyond the second quarter in the
long duration subsample, we use the fact that workers who are not employed (i.e., with
no earnings) are likely to be collecting extended benefits. Specifically, we calculate
UI income using the following method. We first approximate each worker’s potential
duration of benefits by using the observed regular potential duration and multiplying
it by

99
26 .

This is because the extended potential duration for any individual claimant is

proportional to their regular potential duration. For example, a worker who has a regular
potential duration of 26 weeks may receive up to 99 weeks of benefits, while a worker
99
= 76 weeks of
with 20 weeks of regular potential duration may receive up to 20 · 26

benefits. In each quarter without earnings, we assume that the worker receives the total
possible quarterly UI payments (i.e., the weekly benefit amount multiplied by 13 weeks)
until they exhaust their benefits. Finally, since it is also possible that some workers with
no earnings have exited the labor force (to pursue further education, to retire, or to
collect disability insurance, for example), we further adjust UI receipt downward by a
factor of 0.764, based on the finding in Krueger et al. (2014) that 33.7 percent of workers
who are unemployed for over 27 weeks exit the labor force 15 months later.
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Optimal UI Eligibility: Framework
In this section, we present a simple model that can be used to assess the welfare benefits
of decreasing the UI eligibility threshold. It is similar in spirit to the models of optimal unemployment insurance, e.g., Baily (1978) and Chetty (2008), wherein the social
planner balances the consumption smoothing benefits of providing UI with the cost of
reduced job search effort.
Suppose that the utility of the worker is given by a state independent utility function
u(c), where c is their consumption level, and u(·) is an increasing, concave function.
Workers are all initially unemployed, and some workers are eligible for UI while others
are not. Suppose that the distribution of worker’s previous earnings are given by p.d.f.
f (·), and that the probability of being eligible for UI differs over an earnings threshold,
G. Specifically, the probabilities of eligibility are PA and PB above and below the threshu when unemployed, and
old, respectively. Workers who are eligible for UI consume cUI

those who are not consume cu−UI . The consumption of the unemployed will consist not
only of UI payments, but benefits from all other social assistance programs as well.
When workers are reemployed, they receive a wage w and pay a lump sum tax τ, so that
they consume ce = w − τ.
Workers allocate their one unit of time between (re)employment and unemployment,
and incur a cost of working that is given by a strictly convex cost function ψ(·). An
unemployed worker who is eligible for UI allocates sUI ∈ (0, 1) to employment and
spends 1 − sUI of time unemployed. Therefore, this worker’s utility is given by
u
max(1 − sUI )u(cUI
) + sUI u(ce ) − ψ(sUI )
sUI

Similarly, the worker who is ineligible for UI spends s−UI and 1 − s−UI of the period
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employed and unemployed, respectively. This worker’s utility is
max(1 − s−UI )u(cu−UI ) + s−UI u(ce ) − ψ(s−UI )
s−UI

Since UI-ineligible workers consume less while unemployed, their optimal job search
intensity will be higher than the eligible (sUI < s−UI ). Note that we assume neither
the consumption while employed nor unemployed depend on the value of the previous
earnings, except to determine whether or not the worker is eligible for UI, which is true
within a neighborhood of the UI threshold.
Let PUI (G) ≡ F(G)PB + [1 − F(G)] PA be the proportion of workers who are eligible
for UI. The utilitarian planner’s objective is to maximize expected utility by choosing the
eligibility threshold G such that benefits from all social programs equal the tax collected:


max W (G) = [1 − PUI (G)] (1 − s−UI )u(cu−UI ) + s−UI u(ce ) − ψ(s−UI )
G

u
+PUI (G) [(1 − sUI )u(cUI
) + sUI u(ce ) − ψ(sUI )]

s.t.

[1 − PUI (G)] (1 − s−UI )b−UI + PUI (G)(1 − sUI )bUI
= τ ([1 − PUI (G)] s−UI + PUI (G)sUI )

where bUI are benefits paid by the government while the worker is eligible for UI, and
b−UI are benefits paid while the worker is not.

We will assume that workers do not change pre-layoff employment behavior in re-

sponse to changes in the eligibility threshold. Our data support this assumption, in that
we do not observe bunching near the UI threshold. The marginal welfare increase of
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lowering the eligibility threshold is thus given by
−

dW
dG

=

f (G) [PA − PB ] ·


u
(1 − sUI )u(cUI
) + sUI u(ce ) − ψ(sUI ) − (1 − s−UI )u(cu−UI ) − s−UI u(ce ) + ψ(s−UI )
− {[1 − PUI (G)] s−UI + PUI (G)sUI } u0 (ce )

dτ
dG

(1)

The first term of Equation (1) reflects the benefits of giving UI eligibility to the marginal
worker at the UI threshold, while the second term reflects tax costs. Using the workers’
optimality conditions and the mean value theorem, it can be shown that the first term is
 u

greater than f (G) [PA − PB ] (1 − s−UI ) u(cUI
) − u(cu−UI ) .2
Note that the government budget constraint can be written as
τ=

[1 − PUI (G)] (1 − s−UI )b−UI + PUI (G)(1 − sUI )bUI
[1 − PUI (G)] s−UI + PUI (G)sUI

which yields
(1 − s−UI )b−UI − (1 − sUI )bUI
dτ
= f (G) [PA − PB ]
dG
[1 − PUI (G)] s−UI + PUI (G)sUI
τ
− f (G) [PA − PB ] {s−UI − sUI }
[1 − PUI (G)] s−UI + PUI (G)sUI
Plugging this expression back into (1) yields

−

dW
dG


 u

> f (G) [PA − PB ] (1 − s−UI ) u(cUI
) − u(cu−UI )

(2)

−u0 (ce ) [(1 − sUI )bUI − (1 − s−UI )b−UI + (s−UI − sUI ) τ]

We can use the right hand side of (2) to assess whether it will be welfare enhancing
to increase or decrease the eligibility threshold. The first term within the braces reflects
2 Worker

u ) = ψ 0 (s ) and u(ce ) − u(cu ) = ψ 0 (s
optimality conditions are u(ce ) − u(cUI
UI
−UI ).
−UI
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consumption smoothing benefits of lowering the threshold. The second term within the
braces reflects the cost: Expanding eligibility means that more benefits must be paid
out, and since workers spend a longer time unemployed, tax revenues also decrease. A
positive value of the right-hand side indicates that UI eligibility has net positive benefits from consumption smoothing and that it will be optimal to lower the eligibility
threshold. A negative value indicates that lowering the eligibility threshold may have
net positive benefits due to shorter durations of unemployment, but the welfare effects
would be ambiguous. Note that since f (G) [PA − PB ] is positive, we only need the sign
of the term in braces.
Optimal UI Eligibility: Model Calibration
Now, we take our empirically estimated quantities to calibrate the above model. For
this exercise, we use estimates from the long duration subsample, though the conclusions are generally the same for the short duration subsample. We assume that worker’s
utility is given by a CRRA utility function: u(c) =

c1−γ
1−γ ,

where γ ∈ [1, 4], as in Gruber

(1997). For F(G), we use the approximate proportion of “new” claimants below the UI
threshold, 0.1. The probabilities of receiving UI above and below the threshold, PA and
PB , are given by the estimated first stage intercepts from Equation (2): To the left of the
threshold, the probability of eligibility is α̂0 = 0.10, whereas the probability to the right
of the threshold is α̂0 + τ̂d = 0.58.
The remaining empirical quantities (income, jobless durations, and benefit levels)
need to be obtained for the UI eligible and ineligible. Since the RD design generates exogenous variation in UI eligibility at the minimum earnings threshold, we use intercept
estimates of Equations (1), (2), and (3), where the dependent variables are measures of
income, durations, and benefits. For each outcome, the quantities β̂0 + τ̂y + (1 − α̂0 −
τ̂d )τ̂ and β̂0 − α̂0 τ̂ correspond to the UI-eligible and ineligible, respectively. Note that
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these are the upper and lower reduced form intercepts, β̂0 + τ̂y and β̂0 , with an adjustment factor. The adjustment factors are necessary because not every claimant above
the threshold receives UI and not every claimant below the threshold is a nonrecipient.
The terms (1 − α̂0 − τ̂d )τ̂ and −α̂0 τ̂ mechanically “sharpen” the first stage, so that the
difference is exactly the fuzzy RD estimate.
As a proxy for consumption while employed, ce , we use total observed income (i.e.,
earnings, UI, and means-tested benefits) in the quarter right before layoff. As shown in
Panel C of Figure 13, the estimated intercepts are quite similar for those who do and
do not receive UI. In the calibration, we use an average of the two: ce = 2512.30. For
u , we assume that the only income workers
consumption while unemployed, cu−UI and cUI

get is transfer income from UI and means-tested benefit programs, and use the combined
UI and means-tested program benefits in the quarter right after layoff. For UI eligibles,
u = 1802.12 and for ineligibles , cu
cUI
−UI = 616.24. Since the government pays for both
u .
UI and means-tested programs, b−UI = cu−UI and bUI = cUI

Finally, we calculate the time spent unemployed, 1 − s−UI and 1 − sUI , using the
estimated durations of initial nonemployment spells, as measured by the number of
consecutive quarters without earnings. In the data, we find that the average duration
for UI-ineligible workers is 2.68 quarters, whereas the average duration for eligible
workers is 3.37 quarters. Since 1 − sUI and 1 − s−UI are expressed as proportions of time
spent unemployed, we divide each of these by 10 quarters, which is where we truncate
durations, so that 1 − sUI = 0.34 and 1 − s−UI = 0.27. The proportions of time spent
employed, sUI = 0.66 and s−UI = 0.73 roughly translate to 21 months of employment,
which is close to the observed preseparation job tenure among workers near the RD
threshold (Table 1).
Plugging these empirical quantities into expression (2), we find that for γ ∈ [1, 4], the
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term in braces is always positive. This implies that the consumption smoothing benefits
from lowering the UI eligibility threshold exceeds the cost of increased benefits and
foregone tax revenue.
Our measures of consumption may be understated if household income is what ultimately matters for consumption. Using individual income may overstate the drop in
consumption during unemployment, which will overstate the consumption smoothing
benefits of UI. While we do not observe households in the administrative data, we
can nevertheless attempt to ballpark the consumption smoothing benefits of UI within
households. To do this, we assume that households comprise of two workers, and that
they both make the same amount when employed. If consumption is equal to the income of the two earners, means-tested benefits, and UI, consumption when employed
is ce = 4672.74. When one household member becomes unemployed, income drops to
u = 3943.58 or cu
cUI
−UI = 2795.65. Social benefits remain the same at bUI = 1802.12

and b−UI = 616.24. This exercise assumes that spousal earnings do not respond when
one member of the household becomes unemployed, which approximates the negligible to small effects found in the literature (e.g., Rothstein and Valletta (2014)); and that
spousal earnings do not respond to UI eligibility, which is more contentious, as Cullen
and Gruber (2000) find that wives have large labor supply response to husbands’ UI
benefits, but Kawano and LaLumia (2014) do not. When we plug these quantities into
expression (2), we still find that for values of risk aversion γ ≥ 1.02, lowering the eligi-

bility threshold is welfare-enhancing.3

3 For

the short duration subsample, lowering the threshold is optimal for γ = 1 as well.
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Appendix Figure 1: Probability of Previous TANF, SNAP, or Medicaid Receipt

Notes: This figure plots the proportion of UI claimants who are observed to have received benefits from any of
the three means-tested programs prior to claiming UI in each non-overlapping $75 interval of the (normalized)
high quarter earnings. The vertical line denotes the minimum earnings threshold.
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Appendix Figure 2: Employment in Various Quarters Relative to Claim Filing
A. Short Potential Duration

B. Long Potential Duration

Notes: This figure plots the fraction of UI claimants who were employed during a certain quarter relative to the
UI claim filing in each category of high quarter earnings. The vertical lines denote the minimum earnings
threshold.
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Appendix Figure 3: TANF Participation in Various Quarters Relative to Claim Filing
A. Short Potential Duration

B. Long Potential Duration

Notes: This figure plots the fraction of UI claimants who received TANF benefits during a certain quarter
relative to the UI claim filing in each category of high quarter earnings. The vertical lines denote the minimum
earnings threshold.
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Appendix Figure 4: SNAP Participation in Various Quarters Relative to Claim Filing
A. Short Potential Duration

B. Long Potential Duration

Notes: This figure plots the fraction of UI claimants who received SNAP benefits during a certain quarter
relative to the UI claim filing in each category of high quarter earnings. The vertical lines denote the minimum
earnings threshold.
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Appendix Figure 5: Medicaid Participation in Various Quarters Relative to Claim Filing
A. Short Potential Duration

B. Long Potential Duration

Notes: This figure plots the fraction of UI claimants who were enrolled in Medicaid during a certain quarter
relative to the UI claim filing in each category of high quarter earnings. The vertical lines denote the minimum
earnings threshold.
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Appendix Table 1: Local Linear Estimates of First Stage and Main Outcome Discontinuities: Varying Bandwidths
Bandwidth
$700
(3)

$1,500
(1)

$1,000
(2)

$500
(4)

$300
(5)

0.461 ***
(0.003)
0.092

0.448 ***
(0.004)
0.099

0.449 ***
(0.004)
0.102

0.443 ***
(0.005)
0.104

0.439 ***
(0.007)
0.107

0.563 ***
(0.061)
2.554

0.584 ***
(0.076)
2.559

0.514 ***
(0.090)
2.566

0.608 ***
(0.107)
2.536

0.549 ***
(0.138)
2.532

-903.18 ***
(188.02)
8894.06

-983.13 ***
(230.68)
8936.02

-834.82 ***
(272.14)
8950.78

-916.41 ***
(324.29)
9021.40

-250.06 ***
(32.12)
579.19

-254.78 ***
(39.52)
581.18

-229.74 ***
(46.72)
571.75

-192.05 ***
(55.87)
558.09

-142.36 **
(62.18)
2705.93

-161.18 **
(77.18)
2678.05

-114.91
(91.64)
2679.88

-57.29
(109.38)
2679.47

-226.58
(142.61)
2712.72

936

-0.211
(0.191)
7.052

-0.048
(0.227)
7.023

0.070
(0.270)
7.033

-0.187
(0.352)
7.084

1118

194,385

137,708

99,065

59,906

bw
(6)

IK
est.
(7)

bw
(8)

CCT
CI
(9)

A. First Stage
UI Eligible
Value Right Below Thr.
B. Fuzzy RD Estimates: Employment
Initial Nonemployment Duration (Qtrs)
Value Right Below Thr.
Earnings (Over 2.5 Years)
Value Right Below Thr.

-766.69 *
(417.96)
8986.93

666

0.615 *** 1637
(0.11)

778

-874.50 *** 1910
(251.37)

[0.367,0.719]

[-1462.01,-382.77]

C.Fuzzy RD Estimates: Program Participation
Dollars of TANF Benefits

65

Value Right Below Thr.

Dollars of SNAP Benefits
Value Right Below Thr.
Months of Medicaid Benefits
Value Right Below Thr.
N

-0.413 ***
(0.154)
7.179
286,113

-257.19 *** 1059
(72.20)
572.28

-256.11 ***
(42.18)

918

[-300.48,-52.54]

-94.02
(89.30)

1132

[-344.24,83.46]

-0.142
(0.212)

899

[-0.459,0.739]

Notes: Panel A reports estimates of τd from Equation (2) and panels B and C report RD estimates τ from Equation (3), where each entry is obtained using separate regressions. The
values right below the threshold are point estimates of intercept terms β₀ from Equation (1). Each column corresponds to a different bandwidth. Cols. (6)-(7) report the Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012) bandwidth and corresponding estimate. Col. (8) reports the bandwidth using Calonico et al. (2015)'s bandwidth selector and col. (9) reports the bias-corrected
confidence intervals. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the person level. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix Table 2: Local Linear Estimates of First Stage and Main Outcome Discontinuities: Varying Bandwidths, Short Duration Sample
Bandwidth
$700
(3)

$1,500
(1)

$1,000
(2)

$500
(4)

$300
(5)

0.421 ***
(0.005)
0.099

0.404 ***
(0.006)
0.107

0.403 ***
(0.007)
0.109

0.396 ***
(0.008)
0.110

0.391 ***
(0.011)
0.117

0.326 ***
(0.109)
2.519

0.348 **
(0.136)
2.529

0.322 **
(0.161)
2.529

0.488 **
(0.193)
2.452

0.523 **
(0.250)
2.407

bw
(6)

IK
est.
(7)

bw
(8)

CCT
CI
(9)

A. First Stage
UI Eligible
Value Right Below Thr.
B. Fuzzy RD Estimates: Employment
Initial Nonemployment Duration (Qtrs)
Value Right Below Thr.
Earnings (Over 2.5 Years)
Value Right Below Thr.

-169.49
(361.00)
9145.91

677

0.309 *
(0.160)

589

[-0.034,0.999]

-308.12
(449.31)
9158.88

-444.13
(532.82)
9179.03

-690.07
(632.19)
9405.07

-657.32
(823.56)
9342.37

633

-255.44
(418.35)

618

[-2700.26,821.52]

-112.39
(80.60)
718.33

-42.29
(95.82)
705.91

-44.04
(114.94)
689.78

-235.03
(149.83)
714.28

850

-97.41
(76.41)

1329

[-270.93,127.71]

-76.17
(121.36)
2116.59

-59.49
(143.83)
2126.07

-81.33
(172.07)
2122.80

-336.09
(223.69)
2139.23

613

-36.38
(136.12)

601

[-611.93,314.65]

0.038
(0.355)
7.366

0.281
(0.422)
7.339

0.247
(0.503)
7.364

-0.414
(0.655)
7.358

662

571

[-1.719,1.058]

78,626

55,435

39,780

23,847

C.Fuzzy RD Estimates: Program Participation
Dollars of TANF Benefits
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Value Right Below Thr.

Dollars of SNAP Benefits
Value Right Below Thr.
Months of Medicaid Benefits
Value Right Below Thr.
N

-125.45 *
(64.30)
711.23
-128.11
(96.01)
2140.82
-0.516 *
(0.281)
7.594
118,523

-0.516 *
(0.276)

Notes: Panel A reports estimates of τd from Equation (2) and panels B and C report RD estimates τ from Equation (3), where each entry is obtained using separate regressions. The
values right below the threshold are point estimates of intercept terms β₀ from Equation (1). Each column corresponds to a different bandwidth. Cols. (6)-(7) report the Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012) bandwidth and corresponding estimate. Col. (8) reports the bandwidth using Calonico et al. (2015)'s bandwidth selector and col. (9) reports the bias-corrected
confidence intervals. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the person level. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix Table 3: Local Linear Estimates of First Stage and Main Outcome Discontinuities: Varying Bandwidths, Long Duration Sample
Bandwidth
$700
(3)

$1,500
(1)

$1,000
(2)

$500
(4)

$300
(5)

bw
(6)

0.497 ***
(0.005)
0.092

0.485 ***
(0.006)
0.097

0.484 ***
(0.007)
0.100

0.485 ***
(0.008)
0.102

0.476 ***
(0.011)
0.104

0.745 ***
(0.095)
2.743

0.758 ***
(0.118)
2.737

0.682 ***
(0.140)
2.753

0.776 ***
(0.164)
2.761

0.658 *** 1057
(0.214)
2.748

IK
est.
(7)

bw
(8)

CCT
CI
(9)

A. First Stage
UI Eligible
Value Right Below Thr.
B. Fuzzy RD Estimates: Employment
Initial Nonemployment Duration (Qtrs)
Value Right Below Thr.
Earnings (Over 2.5 Years)
Value Right Below Thr.

-1378.56 *** -1326.47 *** -1224.66 *** -1043.23 **
(262.38)
(321.35)
(378.65)
(453.57)
8604.98
8655.97
8715.79
8620.60

-930.05
(582.16)
8757.75

3411

0.730 *** 1905
(0.130)

-944.82 **
(395.73)

[0.451,1.003]

1157

[-2413.46,-69.86]

680

[-444.95,-67.65]

C.Fuzzy RD Estimates: Program Participation
Dollars of TANF Benefits
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Value Right Below Thr.

Dollars of SNAP Benefits
Value Right Below Thr.
Months of Medicaid Benefits
Value Right Below Thr.
N

-343.27 ***
(44.07)
496.41
-162.96
(107.20)
3411.64
-0.519 **
(0.236)
7.377
101,985

-360.61 ***
(53.30)
495.27
-253.91 *
(132.59)
3376.66

-345.76 ***
(62.58)
481.14

-282.64 ***
(73.68)
467.48

-261.36 ***
(93.74)
456.38

580

-268.74 ***
(79.60)

-210.68
(157.23)
3385.95

-35.51
(185.66)
3372.46

-188.81
(243.09)
3417.11

1009

-110.26
(174.61)

761

[-343.69,571.07]

-0.573 **
(0.292)
7.297

-0.430
(0.347)
7.275

-0.150
(0.409)
7.277

-0.046
(0.536)
7.287

809

-0.402
(0.340)

809

[-0.583,1.415]

70,523

50,250

36,039

21,986

Notes: Panel A reports estimates of τd from Equation (2) and panels B and C report RD estimates τ from Equation (3), where each entry is obtained using separate regressions. The
values right below the threshold are point estimates of intercept terms β₀ from Equation (1). Each column corresponds to a different bandwidth. Cols. (6)-(7) report the Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012) bandwidth and corresponding estimate. Col. (8) reports the bandwidth using Calonico et al. (2015)'s bandwidth selector and col. (9) reports the bias-corrected
confidence intervals. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the person level. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Appendix Table 4: Local Linear Estimates of First Stage and Main Outcome Discontinuities: Gender
By Gender
Female
Male
(2)
(3)

All
(1)
A. First Stage
UI Eligible
Value Right Below Thr.
B. Fuzzy RD Estimates: Employment
Initial Nonemployment Duration (Qtrs)
Value Right Below Thr.
Percent Impact
Earnings (Over 2.5 Years)
Value Right Below Thr.
Percent Impact

0.449 ***
(0.004)
0.102

0.495 ***
(0.005)
0.090

0.389 ***
(0.007)
0.120

0.514 ***
(0.090)
2.566
20%

0.417 ***
(0.105)
2.514
17%

0.659 ***
(0.161)
2.560
26%

-834.82 ***
(272.14)
8950.78
-9%

-673.49 **
(287.13)
8417.06
-8%

-1028.47 *
(559.02)
9816.19
-10%

C.Fuzzy RD Estimates: Program Participation (Over Next 2 Years)
Dollars of TANF Benefits
Value Right Below Thr.
Percent Impact
Dollars of SNAP Benefits
Value Right Below Thr.
Percent Impact
Months of Medicaid Benefits
Value Right Below Thr.
Percent Impact
N

-229.74 ***
(46.72)
571.75
-40%

-372.70 ***
(68.64)
917.17
-41%

6.16
(31.28)
87.30
7%

-114.91
(91.64)
2679.88
-4%

-74.79
(117.60)
3221.57
-2%

-235.17 *
(136.33)
1948.61
-12%

-0.048
(0.227)
7.023
-1%

-0.057
(0.287)
9.293
-1%

-0.238
(0.316)
3.893
-6%

137,708

80,419

56,429

Notes: Panel A reports estimates of τd from Equation (2) and panels B and C report RD
estimates τ from Equation (3), where each entry is obtained using separate regressions. The
values right below the threshold are point estimates of intercept terms β₀ from Equation (1).
All regressions use a bandwidth of $700. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at
the person level. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Appendix Table 5: Local Linear Estimates of First Stage and Main Outcome Discontinuities: Dependents

All
(1)

Have
Dependents
(2)

Females w/
Dependents
(3)

A. First Stage
UI Eligible

0.449 ***
(0.004)
0.102

0.469 ***
(0.009)
0.099

0.512 ***
(0.010)
0.085

C. Fuzzy RD Estimates: Employment
Consecutive Jobless Qtrs
0.514 ***
(0.090)
Value Right Below Thr.
2.566
Percent Impact
20%

0.518 ***
(0.168)
2.51
21%

0.287
(0.190)
2.50
12%

Value Right Below Thr.

Earnings (Over 2.5 Years)
Value Right Below Thr.
Percent Impact

-834.82 ***
(272.14)
8950.78
-9%

-521.58
(476.84)
8642.57
-6%

-585.83
(482.61)
8267.40
-7%

C.Fuzzy RD Estimates: Program Participation (Over Next 2 Years)
Dollars of TANF Benefits
Value Right Below Thr.
Percent Impact
Dollars of SNAP Benefits
Value Right Below Thr.
Percent Impact
Months of Medicaid Benefits
Value Right Below Thr.
Percent Impact
N

-229.74 ***
(46.72)
571.75
-40%

-282.55 ***
(107.58)
845.44
-33%

-467.79 ***
(144.65)
1251.27
-37%

-114.91
(91.64)
2679.88
-4%

-371.828 *
(198.148)
3516.02
-11%

-313.36
(234.83)
4092.99
-8%

-0.048
(0.227)
7.023
-1%

0.141
(0.461)
8.928
2%

0.339
(0.539)
11.101
3%

137,708

34,973

22,599

Notes: Panel A reports estimates of τd from Equation (2) and panels B and C
report RD estimates τ from Equation (3), where each entry is obtained using
separate regressions. The values right below the threshold are point estimates of
intercept terms β₀ from Equation (1). All regressions use a bandwidth of $700.
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the person level. *p<0.10,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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